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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 
10935 
This is an action by appellants (hereinafter plaintiffs) 
on behalf of themselves and on behalf of other property 
2 
owners similarly situated for a preliminary injunction re-
straining and preventing respondents (hereinafter defend-
ants) Salt Lake County, its officers and employees from 
issuing any building or other permit which would affect 
property controlled by an ordinance signed January 11, 1967, 
which purportedly reclassified 1.22 acres of property lo-
ca ted at the southeast corner of 2300 East and 4500 South, , 
.Salt Lake County, Utah, from Residential R-3 to Commer- 1 
cial C-1, and for an order invalidating the aforementioned 
ordinance. The complaint alleges that defendants failed to 
give notice of the proposed zoning as is required by section 
17-27-17 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and as 
guaranteed by the XIVth Amendment to the Federal Con-
stiution and that the actions of defendants were arbitrary 
and capricious. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was decided by the trial court following a 
hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. , 
The court after making findings of fact concluded that the 
notice procedure required by the Utah statutes was com· 
plied with, that the amended zoning ordinance is valid, 
that the temporary restraining order then in effect should be 
vacated and that plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment below 
and a judgment in their favor based on the record made 
before the trial court or, if the court finds that additional 
d ts' facts are necessary to determine whether the def en an 
3 
decision results in unlawful "spot zoning" then for remand 
of the case to the District Court for development of a 
trial record on this issue. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about Novemb€r 3, 1966, Bill Roderick, Inc. 
applied to amend the zoning map of Salt Lake County by 
reclassifying property located at 21300 East and 4500 South 
from Residential R-3 to Commercial C-1. (Def. Ex. D-20) 
The Zoning Administrator's staff, the zoning sub-
committee and the County Planning Commission on Novem-
ber 18, 1966, unanimously recommended that the applica-
tion b€ denied.1 A so-called hearing on the application 
before the Salt Lake Board of County Commissioners was 
scheduled for December 28, 1966. Between November 23 
and November 26, 1966, the county purported to give no-
tice of this hearing by affixing two pieces of paper to 
utility poles near the subject property, one piece of paper 
on a posting board at the west steps of the City and County 
Building in Salt Lake City, Utah, and by a single newspaper 
publication. (R. 26, 30, 155) No other notice was given. 
On or about December 28, 1966, Marvin G. Jensen, 
W. G. Larson and John Preston Creer, who were then the 
duly elected and qualified Commissioners of Salt Lake 
County purported to adopt an amendment to the zoning 
ordinance making the requested change, subject to final 
approval at a later date. (Def. Ex. D-35) 
-~November 21, 1966, the zoning office r~ceived a writing pur-
porting to approve the application from a smgle member of the 
Holladay District Planning Commission. (R. 4) 
4 
Subsequent to December 28, 1966, citizens and owners 
of dwellings in the area surrounding 2300 East and 4500 
South first learned of the hearing and the action of the 
Commission; on January 10, 1967, they presented to the 
Commission a written petition requesting reconsideration 
of the zoning change and asking for an opportunity to be 
heard. (Pl. Ex. P-48) The written petition was presented 
to the newly elected Commissioners, Oscar Hanson, Jr. and 
Philip Blomquist. (R. 128) At that time the purported 
zoning change was not in effect. 
The following morning, January 11, 1967, Commissioner 
Blomquist, acting as temporary chairman of the Salt Lake 
County Commission (in the absence of Chairman Hanson) 
signed an ordinance purporting to place into effect the 
amendment of section 8-10-4 of the Revised Ordinances of 
Salt Lake County to reclassify the subject parcels of prop-
erty from Residential R-3 to Commercial C-1. (Def. Ex. 
1 
D-39) 
Pursuant to a prior appointment, Holladay citizens ap-
peared at the Commission's January 17, 1967, meeting to 
present their position. However, they were informed by 
the Commissioners that the ordinance had been signed and 
that consequently the matter would not be reconsidered or 
reheard. 
PLAINTIFFS' POSITION 
The trial court's decision should be reversed since the 
ordinance attempting to change the zoning of the subject 
parcels at 2300 East and 4500 South is invalid in the fol· 
lowing particulars : 
5 
1. Defendant county lacked jurisdiction to hear 
the matter on December 28, 1966, because it failed to 
give adequate notice of the hearing to interested per-
sons as required by law. 
2. Even if the applicable notice statute were com-
plied with, the procedure undertaken by Salt Lake 
County to give notice to affected property owners was 
so inadequate that the action of the County based 
thereon deprives such owners of rights guaranteed by 
the Due Process clauses of the Federal and Utah Con-
stitutions. 
3. In addition to failing to give adequate notice 
defendants failed to observe other statutory and pro-
cedural requirements and such failure invalidates the 
attempted change of zoning. 
4. The refusal of defendant County Commissioners 
to permit interested property owners to be heard was 
arbitrary, capricious and in contravention of their pub-
lic trust and duty. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY HAS NEITHER INHER-
ENT NOR UNLIMITED POWER TO AMEND 
ZONING ORDINANCES. 
Municipal corporations do not have inherent nower to 
enact zoning regulations1 nor does the Utah Constitution 
bestow them such power. 
1Tranfaglia v. Bldg. Comm'r of Winchester, 306 Mass. 495, 2.8 
N.E. 2d 537 (1940). 
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The power to regulate land for the health, welfare 
and safety of the community is an attribute of police Power 
which is delegated in the first instance to the state legis-
lature. In turn, the state legislature, through enabling acts, 
authorizes municipalities to regulate the use of land; but 
it also imposes limitations upon the substance of such 
regulation and upon the procedures used. Baker v. Switzer, 
209 App. Div. 151, 205 N.Y. Supp. 108 (1924). 
In Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty Co., 3 Utah 2d l, 
277 P. 2d 805, 800 (1954), this Court quoting from Hurstv. 
City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 277 Pac. 308 (1929) re-
ferred to the status assumed by a municipality in passing 
zoning measures, as well as some of the critical procedural 
conditions precedent to its exercise of this power: 
When the statute requires notice and hearing as 
to the possible effect of a zoning law upon property 
rights, the action of the legislative body becomes 
quasi judicial in character, and the statutory notice 
and hearing then becomes necessary in order to sat-
isfy the requirements of due process and may not 
be dispensed with. 
See DeLuca v. Bd. of Supervisors, 134 Cal. App. 2d 
606, 286 P.2d 395 (Cal. 1955).1 
II. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY FAILED TO GIVE ADE-
QUATE NOTICE OF THE HEARING TO BE 
HELD DECEMBER 28, 1966, AS REQUIRED 
BY LAW. 
'A zoning ordinance is in derogatio,n of the co~on law. ~;1bi; 
the procedural requirements for adoption and effectiveness .m Inc 
strictly followed. Town of Greenburgh v. Bobandal Realties, " 
203 N.Y.S. 2d 328 (1960). 
7 
Section 17-27-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, provided: 
Before finally adopting any such amendment 
the board of county commissioners shall hold a 
public hearing thereon, at least 30 days' notice of 
the time and place of which shall be given by at least 
one publication in a newspaper of general circulation 
in the county and by posting in three public places 
designed to give notice thereof to the persons af-
fected. 
This particular concept of notice has its roots in the 
ancient English custom of attaching notice of various ap-
plications to the door of the church or chapel of any parish 
in the licensing district. For example, the Beerhouse Act, 
1830, s. 32 provides that notice shall be given as follows: 
To insure that the persons likely to be affected 
by the opening of a new inn should have proper 
notice of the proposals and, as it is the people near 
the site who will be affected, the nearest church being 
the one they are likely to visit, is the one where 
the notice should be put. A notice on the main church 
of Burmingham, for example, near the city's centre, 
relating to the new inn at the uttermost limits of 
the city would seldom be seen by persons living 
near the site of the proposed inn; it is likelier to be 
seen by them if posted on a church in the area. 
119 J.P. 829 (1955). 
In more recent times the United States Supreme Court 
has voiced itself on the purpose and method required in giv-
ing notice. At stated by Justice Jackson in Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314 
(1950): 
8 
The fundamental requisite of due process of 
law is the opportunity to be heard. 
An elementary and fundamental requirement of 
due process in any proceeding which is to be ac-
corded finality is notice reasonably calculated under 
all the circumstances to apprise interested parties 
of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections. A notice 
must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the 
required information and it must afford reasonable 
time to those interested to make their appearance. 
[Emphasis added] 1 
That an adjacent property owner is such an interested 
party is the court's holding in Marculescu v. City Planning 
Comm'n, 46 P.2d 308, 310 (Cal. 1935), 7 C.A.2d 371: 
It needs no argument to show that an adja-
cent property owner is interested in the use to which 
his neighbor may legally put his property, for obvi-
ously such use must affect the value of his adjoin-
ing property, either injuriously or beneficially. 
Reiterated, Section 17-27-17 of the Utah Code provides 
that notice be given by posting in three public places de-
signed to give notice thereof to the persons affected. The 
following discussion is centered on analyzing the intent of 
this statutory mandate and in showing that the County 
Commission failed to observe the notice requirements of 
the section. 
(a) The County Did Not Use an Adequate Mode or 
Manner of Giving Notice. 
1This court recently held in Gaywnd v. Salt Lake County, 11,Utah 
2d 307 358 P 2d 633 (1961) that citizen-owners of dwellmgs m an 
area t~ be aff~cted by a chan'ge of zoning are entitled to due process 
of law. 
At the hearing one witness, Mr. Evans, gave testimony 
from which the court could find that the Zoning Adminis-
trator caused to be affixed on November 23, 1966, to the 
probate notice board of the west steps of the City and 
County Building a summary of several applications for 
zoning amendments which were to be heard by the Salt 
Lake County Commission on December 28, 1966. (Def. Ex. 
D-55) This document was in two pages, the first page 
being in regular type and entitled "Notice of Zoning." The 
subject property was mentioned on the second page. 
There is also some evidence from which the court could 
find that on the 25th day of November, 1966, the Zoning 
Administrator caused a separate piece of paper to be tacked 
to each of the first two utility poles which run along the 
east side of 2300 East south of the intersection of 4500 
South and 2300 East. (R. 30-31) 1 
Neither the County nor the intervenors could produce 
a copy of the pieces of paper allegedly tacked to the utility 
poles. The recollection of one witness, Mr. Clair Y. Hard-
man, was that the pieces of paper were of the usual form 
used by the County (see Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) and contained 
a legal description of the subject property. (R. 26) 
The above described pieces of paper represent the 
sum total of postings made by the County with respect to 
the subject property. 
(1) Postings Were Not Made at Publie Places as 
Required by Law. 
1The utility poles stand on a piece of ground which lies between 
the street and the sidewalk. 
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One of the posting requirements of section 17-27-17 
is that notice be posted in public p'laces. 
A public place is defined as one of public resort, i.e., 
where people frequently meet or have occasion to be. Hamm 
Constr. Co. v. Dempster Bros., 36 Tenn. App. 356, 255 S.W. 
2d 712 (1953). As expressed in Armstrong v. New LaPaza 
Gold Mining Co., 107 F. 2d 453 (9th Cir. 1939): 
We find no Arizona cases defining the term 
"public place" but cases arising in other jurisdictions 
are quite uniform in their definitions, and we are 
certain that Arizona would follow. We quote the 
definition contained in Words and Phrases, 2nd 
Series, vol. 4, p. 23: "The term public place as used 
in St. 1898, section 1130, providing for the posting 
of tax sale notices in at least four public places in 
the county, was used in its ordinary common sense 
to designate a place where the public resorts, so that 
the exposure of the document was likely to give no-
tice." Bauchier v. Hammer, 140 Wis. 648, 123 N.W. 
132, 134. 
Practically no one frequents, meets, or has occasion 
to be at a vacant lot (2300 East and 4500 South) during 
the middle of the winter. True, cars pass by the poles, 
but the probability that the occupants traveling 30 to 40 
miles an hour could read a piece of paper posted to face 
the street is extremely doubtful. Lake v. Riutcel, 249 
S.W. 2d 450 (Mo. 1952). 
Similarly no one who lives in Holladay frequents, 
meets at or could reasonably be expected to be looking reg-
ularly at the west steps of the City and County Building 
for notices of proposed change of zoning of real property 
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located in Holladay, miles away. No reasonable govern-
mental administrator could expect the "public" residing in 
Holladay to stop at the west steps of the City and County 
Building once each 30 days to look at legal descriptions to 
learn if any proposed change of zoning affected their prop-
erties in Holladay. Until something draws the attention of 
a property owner, he assumes that his property is safe. 
A notice that his property is in danger must be reasonably 
calculated to draw his attention; otherwise, he never learns 
of it. The County and respondents would have us believe 
that members of the "public" residing in Holladay would be 
alerted by a legal description on the under-sheet of two 
pieces of paper placed on the west steps of the City and 
County Building. No reasonable man could believe such 
to be so. 
A public place is precisely that - a place where the 
public meets; and, in the Holladay area there are many 
such places, viz., post office, library, shopping centers, 
churches, schools (see 90 A.L.R. 2d 1211). The County's 
complete failure to post any notice in any public place fre-
quented by Holladay residents is fatal to the requisite juris-
diction needed by the County in zoning matters. 
(2) Postings Were Made at Only Two, Not Three, 
Places. 
A second posting requirement of section 17-27-17 i~ 
that the notice be posted in three places. 
Statutes requiring posting of three notices in public 
places have been interpreted as meaning posting at three 
12 
different geographical locations.1 In Standley v. Knapp, 
113 Cal. App. 91, 298 Pac. 109, 112 (Cal. 1931) the court 
said: 
In Corpus Juris, volume 23, at page 637, we 
find as follows: "A public place, as the term is used 
in the statutes, has been held to mean such a place 
that an advertisement posted on it would be likely 
to attract general attention so that its contents 
might reasonably be expected to become a matter of 
notoriety in the vicinity." In National Loan & Inv. 
Co. v. Doren Blazer, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 148, at page 
151, 69 S.W. 1019, the court holds that a statute 
requiring that a notice of sale under a deed of trust 
be given by posting written or printed notices there-
of in three public places in the county where the sale 
is to take place is not complied with by posting one 
notice at the courtroom door, another on a telephone 
pole at the northeast corner of the courthouse square, 
and another on a telephone pole at the northwest 
corner of the courthouse square. 2 
The County's act of posting two notices at one place -
the east side of the corner of 2300 East and 4500 South -
amounted to one, not two, postings. 
It is not the number of pieces of paper posted that 
counts, but rather the number of different places at which 
they are posted. The intent of the statute could not be 
complied with by posting three separate pieces of paper 
on a single pole. Nor should a similar result be gained 
1Graham v. Fitts, 53 Miss. 307 (1876); Dacus v. Knoxville Out· 
fitting Co., 9 Tenn. App. 683 (1929). (lgS4) 
'In In Re Howard's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 112, 269 P.2d 104~ e~ 
the Utah Supreme Court tacitly recognized tha! three pu~hc pl1c 1 means three different geographic locations. In this case, a will .con esd 
proceeding, "notice was posted at the west e~trance to the City ~h 
County Building, another on a public bulletm board on 33rd ~ird 
and State Street, on which corner a church was located, and the 
in the Murray Post Office." 
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by posting two separate pieces of paper on adjacent poles. 
At most, the county only posted notice at two places - viz., 
the City and County Building and one side of the corner 
of 2300 East and 4500 South.1 
(3) Places of Postings Were .Not "Designed to Give 
Notice Thereof to the Persons Affected" as Required by 
Law. 
The applicable statute does not stop with requiring 
postings "in three public places." It contains an express 
directive about where the postings must be. By statutory 
mandate, the postings must be in three public places "de-
signed to give notice thereof to the persons affected." 
It is not to be supposed that the legislature, when 
enacting this statute, intended this language to be mean-
ingless. At a minimum, this language means some place 
other than just any place which is not private or secret. 
In defining what is a public place designed to give 
notice, this Court has said: 
The paramount controlling principle which 
should guide the posting of notice [in probate mat-
ters] is that the two notices which are to be posted 
other than at the courthouse should be placed in the 
county at places most likely to reach parties inter-
1The subject property consists of two parcels one at the southeast, 
comer of the intersection of 2300 East and 41500 South and the other 
at the Southwest corner of the intersection of 4500 South and _Russell 
Street. Even though there are utility poles between the traffic lanes 
of Russell Street and the east parcel of the subject _Propei:ty and on 
the east side of the traffic lanes of Russell Street munediately east 
?f the east parcel of the subject properties no piece of paper purport-
mg to give notice was affixed to any of these poles or to any other 
place near the second parcel. 
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est~. . . . These should be customary places at 
which all such n?tices should be posted, which places 
should be conspicuously public points and not on th 
byways. In re Phi~lips' Estate, 86 Utah 358, 44 P.2~ 
699, 703 (1935). [Emphasis added] 
No greater "byway" exists to citizens living in the 
vicinity of 2300 East and 4500 South than the west steps 
of the City and County Building in downtown Salt Lake 
City. 
In Phillips' the court was concerned with the notice 
provisions of the probate statute. That statute rationally 
provides for posting at the courthouse, for it is there that 
people interested in probate matters gather. But, with 
zoning matters1 nothing is further from the truth. Citizens 
living and working in what is in effect a town within the 
county - Holladay - have neither reason nor purpose for 
gathering at or passing by a board located miles from their 
daily activities. 2 
More disturbing is that even if citizens interested in 
this particular zoning matter by happenchance walked by 
this board, the notice posted there would not catch their eye 
as it was placed on a board clearly designated for "probate" 
matters, was not in a form which would be likely to attract 
1The zoning statute, unlike the probate statute, contains no speci· 
fie directive that notice be posted at a courthouse. 
2Even if it were assumed that those persons who live in the 
Holladay Planning District would frequent the west steps of the 
City and County Building, no one could ration,aJ.ly conclude thll;t s~ch 
persons would be likely to wade through a senes of legal descnpt1t?ns 
on pieces of paper tacked on top of each other on th~ probate postm! 
board to determine whether there was to be _a hea_nn~ on a changd 
of zoning of property in the Holladay Planmng D1stnct that woul 
affect them. It tests the credulity of the mind for anyone to urge 
that such a posting would be "designed" to give notice. 
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attention and was "buried" underneath a cover sheet. 
(Def. Ex. D-55) 
The vice of the procedure of posting notice followed 
by Salt Lake County is that none of the places at which 
the postings are made are designed to give notice thereof 
to the persons affected. More is required than mere token 
compliance with the statute, It is not enough to say that 
any public place would be "designed" to give notice. There 
must be something of substance - some rational effect con-
templated from the place chosen to give notice.1 
The posting in "byways" and nonfrequented "public" 
places, coupled with a procedure by which flimsy pieces of 
paper are affixed to utility poles and not subsequently po-
liced (R. 146) cannot possibly be "designated to give notice 
thereof to the persons affected." In fact, the procedure 
of posting notices followed in the instant case is so inade-
quate that one wonders whether the notices posted were 
1 Some attention should be given to the plight of an owner of land 
in Salt Lake County. If the interested property owner (such as plain-
tiff Audrie Kennington) happened to know that a particular parcel 
within the Holladay Planning District were under consideration, he 
could watch that property. But, if the instant case is typical, he 
would experience nothing but frustration because no notice was ever 
placed on any part of the subject property inside of the boundary 
fences. Further, whatever pieces of paper were tacked .to :itility poles 
near one corner of one parcel of the subject property d1dn t stay there 
very long, and would have been visible only if a particular utility pole 
were viewed from a certain angle. 
On the other hand, consider the person who has not been ~erted 
by the rumor or otherwise that property- or for that matter. his <?wn 
home - is the subject of an application for a change of zo~g filed 
by someone who is not the record property owner. No notice ~ould 
appear at any post office, shopping center, church, town _hall, ~1qu_or 
store, library or other place within the Holladay Planrung D1stnct 
where the public frequents or goes. Such person would h~ve to. m~e 
monthly checks of every utility pole in the Holladay Planning District. 
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designed so that home owners who would be affected would 
not be informed. 
(b) The Contents of the Legal Descriptions Which 
the County Used in Attempting to Give Notice Were Not 
Adequate. 
Section 17-27-17, Utah Code Annotated, provides that 
"thirty days' notice of the time and place . . . [of a public 
hearing] shall be given by at least one publication in a news-
paper ... " 
The whole pupose of this requirement is to inform -
actually to put on notice; it was not meant to be a mere 
mechanical formality requiring only token compliance. 
In describing what is required of a published notice, 
the court said in Board of County Comm'rs of Sarpy County 
v. McNally, 168 Neb. 23, 95 N.W. 2d 153, 160 (1959); 
Notice is futile unless a property owner is able 
to determine from such notice that his property is 
or is not affected. This would seem to be the obvious 
purpose of the statutory requirement for publication 
The content of the notice is sufficient if it gives the average 
reader reasonable warning that the property in which he 
has an interest may be affected by the proposed zoning legis-
lation and affords him an opportunity by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence to determine whether such is the fact. 
2525 East Ave. Inc. v. Town of Brighton, 33 Misc. 2d 1029, 
228 N.Y.S. 2d 209 (1962). 
The actual notice of the subject property appeared in 
the Salt Lake Tribune on November 26, 1966, as follows: 
NOTIC• OP ZONING HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN OF 
a public hearinq to be held in Room 
206, Ci!Y. and County Building, Salt 
Lake CitY, Salt Lake Counfy, Utah on Wednesday, December 28, 1966, at 
JO:OO a.m. o'clock before the Board 
of County Commissioners of Sa It 
Lake Countv on the fOllowln11 aoPll· 
cations raquestin!l rezoning of the 
following described areas In Salt 
Lake County, Utah. 
1. To amend the map of the 
Sandy-Union-East Midvale Planning 
District bv reclassifying the fol· 
1owinf1 described property from Com· 
merc1al Zone C-2 to Residential Zonr 
R-2: 
Beginning at the NE corner of the 
SW 'I• of Section '29, T2S, Rl E, 
SLB&M; thence South 600'; thence 
West 16'.'l' m. or I. to the center line 
of 900 East Street; thence Northeast· 
erly along said center line 850' m. or 
I. to the Quarter Section line; thence 
East along the Quarter line to beain· 
nino. · 
ra1n/0H~~~rsd m:n~g ~ls~~rctLcifv 
reclassifying the following described 
oroPertY from Residential Zone R-2A 
to Residential Zone R-5: 
Commencing 285' m. or I. North 
from the Southeast Corner Lot 3, 
Block 21, 10 Acre Plirt "A", Big 
~~~t, ~~~~Yi00'1,h)~~~cew~~t jj~; 
thence South 100' to beginning. 
3. To a mend the map of the South 
Cottonwood Planning District bY rec-
lassifying the followina described 
prooertv from Residential Zone R·2 
to Commercial Zone C-1: 
of 't~'W~111?n:to1a 1 f&'1:.1N' s!'/eW. 
said ooint belna North 29 dea. 51 
min. 19 sec. West 074.37' and North 
O deg. Zl min. East Zl4.'Jl' from the 
SE corner of Section 17, T2S, RlE, 
SLB&M1 running thence North O 
deg. 27 min. East JOO' m. or I. to 
fence line; thence westerlv along 
said fence fine 523.12'; thence South 
&~~.~h 0vii/ag~o s~~i~~f6~; 1m:ng! 
Easterly along said line 526' m. or 
l.1 thence North 131' m. or I. to 
DOlnt of beginnin!l. 
4. To amend the map of the 
SDandv-Unlon-East Midvale Planning 
istrict by reclusifyina the fol· 
~e~\7~1 ~~~Jbe~-~oogtY c~~e~~r~i 
Zone C-2: · 
N.;r%"ri.~~ 17~e 1 fe0.:t;t;e~I ~~~11b~12~: 
T2S, RlE, SLB&M; thence East 366'; 
!Whence South 218' to canal; thence 
N esterlY along canal 12.6'; thence 
th~~~ 7Xe~~r1y51a1'ci'ni~. c'r/(vS:, 11t6i~ 
?~~~ceNN'6t~h s8'f d::,:9i5' ~~'it 1m~ 
lh"f~ 4t~\W· v45 de~.n·1.f~ln 89fl~J 
33'; thence East 158' to be!lfnnlng. 
1.73 Ac. 
5. To amend the map of the Cot· 
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tonwoo.d Plannlnq District bv re •1 lassltying the following describ~ 
Pt roRcertv lr9m Residential Zone R·l Bl 
o e~1d~nt1al Zone R·l: 
Be.sinning . at a Doint created b 
the intersection of the center 1 ines ~ 
Donelson Lane (5165 South Street) ~~drt2h10073'East Street, said Point being m. or I. and West 379' m 
0l1._ I. from the Southeast corner oi f,l"' SeNorthwest 11• Of the Southwest 
th
•, ct1on 10, T2S, RlE, SLB&M· 
enc:e North 79 des 48 min 
West 191' "'.'· or I.; thence North 
2 dea. 46 min. SO sec. East 363 73'· 
W
thence North 75 deg. 12 min 40 "sec 
est 123.68'; thence North" 1 de · 
East 191.50'; thence East 305 06' fo 
t
thhe center line of 2100 East street· 
ence South O dea 04 min East ;J~~fn~aid center line to Point of be-
6. To llrnend the mao of th~ South CottonwoOd Plannlnq Dis· 
trict by reclassifying the foliowing 
dzescrlbed property from Residential 
one .R·1 to Commercial Zone C-7· 
.,.l\es1nn1ng 325' m. or I East and ~,. m or I. South from ihe NW cor-
ner of Section 16. T2S, RIE. SLB&M· 
thence East. 551.02' to a coint on a 
3.:!..44.83' radius curve to the rlaht; 
""'nee Southeasterly alona said 
cu_rve S.38'; thence South 19 deg. 26 
min. East 201.88'; thence West 
100.28; thence south 180 CO'; thence 
East 1.50'.; thence South 
0
541' to the 
center line of 5600 South Steet1 
thence West along said center line 
687.06'; thence North O dell. 07 min 
East 957' to beginning · 
B,C!linning 325' m. or I. East and 
398 m. or I. South from the 
NW corner of Section 16. T2S f'lE SLB&~; thence East to the cen~ 
ter .ine of the Cottonwood Di-
agonal Expressway; thence South 
19 deJI. 26 min. E?St along said cen-
ter line to a 001nt Of intersection 
with the center line of 5600 South 
S.treet; thence West along the center 
I 1ne of 5600 South Street to a ooint 
due South Of beginninq; thence 
North to the ooinl of beginning. 
7. To amend the mao Of the Holla-
dav Planninct Distict bv reclassifying 
the followinq d<>scribed Prot>erty 
from Residential Zone R·J to Com-
mercial Zone C-1: 
Commencing 253.09' South from the 
center of Section 3. T2S, RlE, 
SLB&M; thence Easterly alono a 
1186.3' radius curve to the left .d60' m. 
or I. to the center line of Russell 
Street; thence South 8 deg. 25 min. 
East 200' m. or I.; thence South 86 
deg. 30 min. West 477.70' m. or I. to 
the centor line ol 2300 East Street; 
thence North to beolnning. 
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In Brachfeld v. Sforza, 114 N.Y.S. 2d 722, 725 (1952) 
the court held: 
A notice of hearing as the basis of a local ordi-
nance should unambiguously set forth reasonable 
information concerning the subject matter of the 
hearing to the end that adequate warning be given 
to all persons whose rights might be affected by ac-
tion of the local board . . . What is said in Palmer 
v. Mann ... is pertinent, to wit ... when a statute 
requires a notice to be given to the public, such a 
notice should fairly be given the meaning it would 
reflect upon the mind of the ordinary layman and 
not as it would be construed by one familiar with 
the technicalities solely applicable to the laws and 
rules of the zoning commission ... It is at least not 
too much to ask that any ambiguity in a notice to the 
public of so important a change, which is the only 
notice that the public has, should be resolved against 
the notice. 
See also, Holly Development Inc v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Arapahoe, 140 Colo. 95, 342 P.2d 1032 
(1959). 
An average person reading the above newspaper publi-
cation would be bewildered. 1 To him what does an apostro-
phe mean, where is the center of section 3, how large is sec-
tion 3, what does T2S mean, what is RlE, what or where is 
SLB&M, which way is a radius curve to the left, is it "m. or 
l." or is it "m or one."2 
1To make things even more confusing, the so-called legal d~ci:iP· 
tion fastened to the probate board at the City and County Bmld:ing 
differs from the legal description contained in the newspaper pu_bli~· 
tion. (Because the county could not produce a copy of the descnption 
posted on the utility poles, there is no way of knowing its c~ntenf?.) d 
'The so-called legal description used by the county. is so ma e· 
quate and inaccurate that even lawyers and other prof~s1~nal ~rsM 
would be confused. The cardinal rule for legal descriptions is t a 
monuments take precedence over courses and distances and ~wer plats. 
6 Powell on Real Property 202 (Section 890); Hofer v. Carino, 4 N.J. 
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Super 244, _72 A.2d 335 (1950) (intersection of center lines of two 
r~ds). It is fundll?Jlental that a complete and accurate legal descrip-t~on shoul9- sta~ with a monument. But, the so-called legal descrip-
tion. contame9- m. the newspaper publication starts from the center of 
section 3 Vl'.hich is not a monlJ!ll~nt at all. It is merely a dot on a 
plat - a piece. of paper. In this mstance, the legal description should 
~ave started with a monument such as the intersection of the center 
line of 2300 East Street and the center line of 4500 South Street As 
such the legal description would have read: · 
Commencing at the intersection of the center line of 
2300 East Street and the center line of 4500 South Street 
which point is about 253.09 feet south from the center of 
section 3, Township 2 South, Range 1 East Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. . . . ' 
If the ~egal ~escription had said nothing more than that much, a 
reader immediately would have known that the property involved 
was abutting the intersection of 2300 East and 4500 South Street 
and would have been given a warning. Similarly, the legal description 
should have continued by reference to physical monuments and should 
have said: 
. . . thence Easterly along the center line of 4500 South 
Street on a 1186.3 foot radius curve to the left . . . 
Again, if the legal description had been tied into the existing mon-
ument ( 4500 South Street), a reader would have been immediately 
aware that 4500 South Street was involved. The legal description 
to be adequate for a lawyer should have continued: 
. . . 460 feet more or less to the intersection of the center 
line of 4500 South Street and the center line of Russell 
Street ... 
Again, if the legal description had been tied into existing monu-
ments in this manner, a resident on Russell Street near 4500 South 
could have immediately determined that the property abutting the 
intersection of Russell Street and 4500 South Street was to be the 
subject of a change of zoning. 
The so-called legal description which was used then continued: 
... thence South 8 deg. 25 min. East 200' m. or l.; ... 
The words did not say what m. or 1. meant. Even more important, 
if "m." meant more and "l." meant less, the words did not say more 
or less to what. The only proper way to use a "more or less" phrase 
in an accurate legal description would b~ to say "m?re or less" to 
a monument. This was not done. The distance on this course there-
fore could be any number of feet - as few as a score, or as many as 
several hundreds. 
It would not be possible, therefore, to determine with ce~tainty 
where the next leg turned westward. Nor would it be possible to 
work backwards from the last leg - the one that extended nort?ward 
to the point of beginning. T~e reason i~ that this last !eg did not 
reflect the distance from the mtersect with the center line of 2300 
East Street to the point of beginning. 
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While it is true that the language of the legal description 
~efers to the center line of Russell Street and also the center 
lme of 2300 East Street, the average reader would know that 
both Russell and 2300 East Street are very long streets 
and roug~ly yar.allel each other. And, because there is n~ 
language md1catmg what south street is involved, the reader 
could reasonably suppose that the application for commer-
cial use would affect property along that part of 2300 East 
which runs through the downtown Holladay business dis-
trict. 
In Berrata v. Sales, 82 Cal. App. 324, 255 Pac. 538 
(1927), omission of street descriptions in a public notice 
invalidated a proposed zoning ordinance. Here, similar 
defects in description exist which make notice impossible 
to even an avid newspaper reader. 
Effectiveness of newspaper publication in giving notice 
was commented upon by Justice Black in Wll!lker v. City of 
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956) : 
It is common knowledge that mere newspaper 
publication rarely informs a landowner of proceed-
ings against his property. 
When the above fact is compounded, as it was in the 
present instance, by failing to describe the property in ques-
tion in such a way that the description is meaningful to 
the reader, the notice requirement of the statute is not 
complied with.1 
i Tt should be noted that each of the following referred to the 
subject property as 23rd East and 45th South; the original application 
of the subject property (Def. Ex. 20), the d~ent forwarded. to 
Henry S. Florence (Pl. Ex. 1), the staff reproduc;t1on of t~e applica· 
ti.on for zoning amendment (Def. Ex. 22), the zorung C?mrmttee !ll~t­
ing agenda the staff analysis (Def. Ex. 25), the Planrung CoIIUillssIOn 
agenda (D~f. Ex. 26), the minutes of the Plal111;ing Co~ssion (Def. 
Ex. '1:7, p. 13), communication between the Zomng Admi~1strator and 
the Board of County Commissioners (Def. Ex. 28), the nunutes of the 
Board of County Commissioners (Def. Ex. 29), and so forth. See, 
Defendants' Exhibits No.'s. 31, 32, 34, 35, 40, 41. 
In spite of the common use of this most obvious an~ m?st des· 
criptive reference, it was omitted in. the newspaper pu_bhcation ani; 
in the piece of paper posted at the Cio/ and County Buildmg anq "'!' 
assume it was likewise omitted in the pieces of paper tacked on utility 
poles, a copy of which the County could not produce. 
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(c) The County Failed to Cause Writings Which At-
tempted to Give Notice to Be Exposed to the View of the 
Public for the Required Period of Time. 
The notice contemplated by Section 17-27-17, Utah Code 
Annotated, is not a one-shot thing. As heretofore discussed, 
there is evidence from which this Court can find that on No-
vember 25, 1966, the County caused two pieces of paper to 
be attached to utility poles on 2300 East. The County failed, 
however, to prove that this notice remained posted for one 
day, one week, or the required one month. In fact, the evi-
dence to the contrary is almost conclusive and the trial court 
should therefore have found that whatever pieces of paper 
were tacked to these poles did not stay on the poles very 
long.1 
One of the plaintiffs' witnesses, Audrie Kennington, 
had been advised by the Zoning Administrator in the sum-
mer of 1966 that she should watch for pieces of paper in the 
form of a notice tacked to utility poles near the subject prop-
erty. (R. 17). Mrs. Kennington testified that she watched 
for said notices but was never able to find one. (R. 19-21) 
lThe only evidence possibly to the contrary came from Dennis 
Leon Ekins a friend of the intervenor-applicant's son. He gave some 
heresay te;timony to the effect that ~ ~pant in .his car . had 
observed a notice sign. On cross-exammation,_ Mr_. Ek1;?5 . admitted 
that the notice and utility pole observed by his fnend nnght have 
been on a pole at another intersection . . ." in the Holladay area. 
(R. 64) 
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Witness Harold Henrichsen, whose property adjoins the 
subject property, testified that he resided next to the prop-
erty in question between Thanksgiving and December 28, 
1966 (R. 86); that during this time he worked in his yard, 
put up Christmas decorations and removed snow from the 
walkway directly in front of one of the utility poles sup-
posedly carrying the posted notice; and that during this 
time he saw no such notice, though he did observe a "For 
Sale" sign on the subject property and saw persons who 
appeared to be surveying the property. (R. 87, 89, 90, 91). 
Another witness, Mrs. Agnes Keller, who does not drive 
and who walked from her home which is on Russell Street 
along the pathway between the two utility poles and the 
properties fronting on the east side of 2300 East, fourteen 
or fifteen times during the period between Thanksgiving 
and December 28, 1966, testified that she observed the utility 
poles but saw no notices tacked to them. (R. 76, 77) 
Similarly, other area citizens who passed through the 
intersection of 2300 East and 4500 South many times each 
week, including Sundays, testified that in ascertaining that 
approaching traffic eastward along 4500 South was not a 
hazard, they looked in the direction of the northernmost 
of the two utility poles and that they saw no papers or signs 
of the type testified to by Mr. Hardman (R. 100, 110-114, 
119, 139, 140) 
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The legislature provided that affected parties should 
have thirty days worth of posted notice.1 In determining 
what is sufficient compliance with such a statute, the court 
said in Callahan Rd. Improvement Co. v. Town of New-
burgh, 167 N.Y.S. 2d 780, 783 (Sup. Ct. 1957) aff'd 173 
N.Y.S. 2d 780 (2d Dept. 1958): 
A slavish and technical adherence to the notice 
is not required. On the other hand there cannot be 
substantial and extensive deviations from the ex-
pressed objectives of the public hearing. 
Or, as stated by courts of sister states: 
[T]he general law prevails and unless the 
[zoning) procedure there specified is substantially 
followed the proposed ordinance does not become 
effective. It needs no citation of authority to sup-
1That more than a single day's notice is required is clear from 
the provisions of section 17-27-17, Utah Code Annotated. The first 
part of this section involves zoning certain portions of the unincor-
porated area within the County. When such action is taken, the 
following notice, is required: 
A notice of the time, the place and purpose of such 
hearing and containing a description of the boundaries of 
the proposed district shall be given by publication in a 
newspaper of general circulation within the County by 
one publication at least 30 days prior to the date of 
such hearing. 
Note: The above notice provision clearly says that the publication 
shall be at least 30 days prwr to the date of such hearing. This 
should be oontrasted with the notice language with respect t.o changing 
a zoning ordinance which appears in the latter portion of this statute: 
At least 30 days notice of the time and place of which 
shall be given by at least one publication in a newspap~r 
of general circulation in the County and by posting m 
three public places designed to give notice thereof to the 
persons affected. . 
There is a substantial difference in the text between the two notice 
provisions found in section 17-27-17. The former says one publica-
tion "at least 30 days prwr to the date of the hearing." The second 
says "at least 30 days' notice of the time and :place shall be. given." 
If the legislature had intended the same meanmg to apply m. ea~h 
case, the legislature would have used the same l~gu~ge. A_s it did 
not, it is clear that with zoning changes 30 days notice is reqwred and 
not one notice 30 days prior to the day of the hearing. 
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port the statement that notice of a proposed passage 
of a zoning ordinance limiting the use of property 
which, otherwise naturally attracts to the property 
in question, is a substantial matter and is one of 
which property owners are entitled to notice. The 
property owners, as has been so frequently said in 
other cases, is entitled to have his day in court. 
Berrata v. Sales, 82 Cal. App. 324, 255 Pac. 538 
(1927). 
See also Wood v. Town of Avondale, 72 Ariz. 217, 232 
P.2d 963 (1951); People v. Village of Oak Park, 228 Ill. 256, 
109 N.E. 11 (1915); Grimmer v. City of Spokane, 64 Wash. 
388, 116 Pac. 878 (1911). 
Substantial compliance with a statute requiring that 
thirty days' notice be given is not complied with through the 
simple act of affixing two pieces of paper to two poles and 
one piece of paper to a probate notice board. To give notice, 
the sign must remain where it is posted for the requisite 
number of days or a period of time substantially equivalent 
thereto.1 Compare Walker v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 208 
Mo. 72, 116 A.2d 393, 401 (1955). The overwhelming 
weight of the evidence demonstrated that neither require-
ment was met in this instance. 
No one on behalf of the County verified that the pieces 
of paper fastened to the probate notice board or to the utility 
poles remained so fastened for thirty days or for any sub-
1 In some jurisdictions procedural requirements outline~ i_n zoning 
ordinance must be strictly followed. 8 McQuiUan on Municipal Cor-
poratrons, §25.245; Town of Greenburgh v. Bobandal Realties, Jnc., 
203 N.Y.S. 2d 328 (1960). 
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stantial part thereof. There is no evidence at all of any 
policing of the pieces of paper.1 
The zoning ordinance must be applied according to its 
letter and spirit. Monument Garage Corp. v. Leavey, 266 
N.Y. 339, 194 N.E. 848, modifying 241 App. Div. 856, 271 
N.Y. Supp. 966, affirming 149 Misc. 791, 268 N.Y. Supp. 
213 (1933). Both the letter and spirit of Section 17-27-17 
require more than the mere tacking up of a piece of paper. 
The section requires that the notice remain conspicuous for 
the requisite period of time in order that an actual warning 
is given to those affected. 
III. 
IF WHAT WAS DONE IN THIS CASE MEETS 
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT, THEN 
THE PROCEDURE AND ACTION TAKEN BY 
THE COUNTY PURSUANT THERETO DE-
PRIVES AFFECTED PROPERTY OWNERS OF 
THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF DUE 
PROCESS. 
Many recent United States Supreme Court cases have 
dealt with this problem of notice. The landmark decision, 
Mullane v. Centrail Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 
( 1950), involved notice by publication to the beneficiaries of 
a common trust fund. The Court thoroughly canvassed the 
problem of sufficiency of notice under the Due Process 
lThe affidavit of the posting of notice signed by witness Hardman 
was not only flagrantly false but was executed by him on December 
15, 1966. (R. 35) The County Co~ission sl;ould not have acted 
until it had proof that thirty days' notice was given p~rsuant to stat-
ute. An affidavit signed December 15, 1966, of a postmg asserted to 
have occurred on November 26, 1966, could not possibly be proof that 
thirty days' notice was given on a hearing to be held December 28, 1966. 
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clause. It found that notice by publication did not give the 
persons sought to be bound proper notice which would ac-
cord them their constitutional rights. Here the trustee knew 
the names and addresses of the beneficiaries and there was 
no tenable ground for not giving them personal notice. The 
reason the published notice was defective was that it was not 
reasonably calculated to give notice, i.e., a means better than 
publication was readily available which, if employed, would 
have more adequately insured that interested parties were 
informed of a matter affecting them. 
The upshot of the Mu~lane case is that if the person seek-
ing to give notice has the name and address within his per-
sonal reach, there is no constitutional reason for not giving 
personal notice to one in danger of being divested of some 
legal interest. The best notice possible under the circum-
stances must be given. 
In Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956), 
the plaintiff owned land in the city of Hutchinson, Kansas. 
Pursuant to statute, defendant city moved to condemn land 
by determining that it was needed for public use. Three 
appointed commissioners assessed the damages. By statute, , 
the commissioners were required to give notice to land· 
owners and lien holders of record, either by giving ten days' 
notice in writing or by publishing notice once in the official 
city newspaper. Published notice was made and damages 
determined. Plaintiff sought to enjoin the city from tres· i 
passing upon his property, contending that he had been 
denied his constitutional right under the Due Process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both the trial court and the ' 
Kansas Supreme Court held that published notice accorded 
to the plaintiff all of the notice and opportunities for hear· 
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in~ to which he ~as entitled. The state court reasoned that 
t~1s ":'as true s1.nce the proceeding was ir. rem., and that 
h1storically, pubhshed notice was sufficient. The plaintiff 
appealed and was granted review. 
Resting on Mullane, the Supreme Court held that pro-
cedural due process had not been afforded to this plaintiff 
and reversed the prior decision. The rule enunciated by the 
Court was: 
... [l]f feasible, notice must be reasonably 
calculated to inform parties of proceedings which 
may directly and adversely affect their legally pro-
tected interests.1 
In Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962), the 
Court was asked to review a New York notice statute. The 
City of New York instituted procedings to acquire the right 
to divert a portion of a river some 25 miles upstream from 
plaintiff's property. In compliance with notice provisions 
of the applicable act, the city published notice in several 
New York newspapers and it also posted 22 notices on trees 
and poles in the general vicinity of plaintiff's premise. Al-
though the name and address of plaintiff was readily as-
certainable from both the deed records and the tax roll, there 
was no attempt personally to notify plaintiff. The Court 
stated: 
We hold that the newspaper publications and 
the posted notices in the circumstances of this case 
did not measure up to the quality of notice which 
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires. 
* * * 
As was emphasized in Mullane, the requirement 
that parties be notified of proceedings affecting their 
lThe essence of Mr. Hard.man's testimony is thB;t the s!gns posted 
by him were not of the type that people would readily notice. (R. 37-
40) (Notice too small to be seen from across the street (R. 37); 
Drivers going north on 23rd East would "have to bend up and look 
up the window" (R. 38, 39); Drivers ooming along 45th South would 
have difficulty seeing the sign due to topography and "because of its 
height above the ground" (R. 39); Pedestrians would have to walk 
"around the pole" to see the sign (R. 40) ) . 
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legally protected interests is obviously a vital corol-
lary to one of the most fundamental requisites of due 
proc~ss-the . right to be heard. "This right . . . 
has little re3:hty or vy-orth unless one is informed that 
the matter is pendmg and can choose for himself 
whether to appeal or default, acquiesce or consent." 
339 U.S. at 314. 
* * * 
The general rule that emerges from the Mul-
lane case is that notice by publication is not enough 
with respect to a person whose name and address 
are known or very easily ascertainable and whose 
legally protected interests are directly affected by 
the proceedings in question.1 
'In Naisbitt u. Herric_k, 76 l!tah. 575, 2~0 Pac. _950 (1930), the 
plaintiff below brought smt to q~et title agamst vanous defendants. 
Plaintiff attempted to secure service of smnmons upon appellant by 
publication even though appellant had been in actual possession of 
the disputed property. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court said: 
In proceedings to open default judgments, . . . where 
there has been merely constructive service of process ... 
[t]he rule of law deductible from the adjudicated cases 
... is that: if a moving party shows (1) that he has not 
been personally served with process, (2) that he has had 
no actual notice of the pendency of the action in time to 
appear and make his defense, (3) that he is injuriously 
affected by the judgment and (4) that he has tendered 
an issue to the merits of the claim of his adversary, then 
and in such case he has an absolute right to have the 
judgment opened. 290 Pac. at 953. 
In defining constructive service of process, the court went on to 
say: 
If it can be said that the particular manner in which 
constructive service is had is well calculated to give notice 
to the person served, then there is a presumption, in the 
absence of proof to the contrary, that such person had 
actual notice. On the other hand, if the manner in which 
constructive service of process is had is not calculated 
to give actual notice to the person served, then there is 
no presumption that such person had actual notice, and 
the burden is cast upon the opposing party to show actual 
notice. Due process of law requires that before one can 
be bound by judgment affecting his property rights, some 
process must be served upon him which in some degree at 
least is calculated to give him notice. 290 Pac. at 954. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In finding service defective in this particular case, the court con· 
eluded: 
If it be true that appellant was in possession ~f the 
premises involved in this proceeding at the time smt was 
begun and thereafter, respondent may not be heard to 
say that appellant was an unknown claimant of the_ pr~m­
ises and thereby secure service of process by publicat10n 
as was done in this case ... 290 Pac. at 954. 
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It is true that in addition to publishing in news-
P:1pers, the city in the present case did put some 
signs on trees and poles along the banks of the river. 
But no such sign was placed anywhere on the appel-
lant's property or ever seen by her.1 371 U.S. at 211-
213. 
See also City of New York v. New York N.H. & H. Ry. 
Co., 344 U.S. 293 (1953). 
The applicability of MuUane and its progeny to zoning 
matters was the topic of an article appearing in 37 Neb. L. 
Rev. 232 (1958). The author noted that Nebraska had a 
zoning statute providing for publication of zoning changes, 
plus the posting of "notices ... in a conspicuous place on or 
near the property ... " 2 The author posed the following ques-
tion: 
Has the Due Process clause of the Constitution 
of the United States been met when personal notice 
is not given under said section 904 nor given except 
as to a certain class under section 905 ?3 
His reasoned answer was as follows: 
In considering the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States [MuUane, Walker, City 
of New York] such decisions indicate that notice 
1 In the present proceeding, neither of the piece;; of paper on the 
two utility poles was "ever seen" by affected parties. Nor wa_s !he 
piece of paper at the west steps of the City and County BUildmg 
ever seen by the affected parties. 
2The Nebraska statute further prnvided that "it shall be unlaw-
ful for anyone to remove, mutilate, destroy or_ change such posted 
notice prior to any hearing. Any person so domg shall be ~ty of 
a misdemeanor." The Utah statute has no comparable proVJS10n. 
3Section 904 of the Nebraska statute pertains to original zo~ing 
by a municipality and section 905 pertains to amending, changmg, 
modifying or repealing zoning regulations theretofore enacted. 
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required under 904 and 905 are not sufficient to 
meet the Due Process clause of the Constitution. 
[Emphasis added.] 
In summary, the essence of Mullane, Walker, City of 
New York, and particularly the recent case of Schroeder 
' is that where a better way of giving notice is readily avail-
able, use of a lesser method is in deprivation of the rights 
guaranteed by the Due Process clause. 
In the present instance, the County knew of- or could 
readily have ascertained the names and addresses of neigh-
borhood property owners who would be affected by the 
change of zoning. A simple form letter would have apprised 
such persons of their rights without unduly hampering or 
burdening the County.1 And, from Mullane, it appears that 
such a notice need not reach everyone, but only those most 
likely to safeguard the interest of all. 2 
The failure of section 17-27-17, Utah Code Annotated, 
to require notice calculated to insure compliance with the 
1The County's own procedural regulations for processing zoning 
applications require the applicant to submit a list of names of prop· 
erty owners within 150 feet of the subject property. Such an expanded 
list, furnished by applicant at its expense, could readily provide the 
basis for a mailing. By way of analogy to a judicial suit, an applicant 
for a zoning change could be required to serve, under affidavit,_no~ce 
to adjacent property owners. The County processed the application 
even though applicant failed to supply these names and addresses. 
ZThe over-all unfairness of the defendants' notice procedure is 
further compounded by the fact that a personal lett~r was _sent w 
Mr. Roderick, the applicant! advising him ?f t,~e public he~nng 3:11d 
requesting him or his authonzed representative _to attend t~s heai;mg 
to present any information which may be pertment to this app~ca· 
tion." (Def. Ex. D-32) No similar notice was sent t~ th~ <?ther s1d_e, 
i.e., affected homeowners. Such action is patently d!scnmmatory in 
violation of Article I, section 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
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XIVth Amendment to the Federal Constitution renders ac-
tion of the County based on the "Notice" part of that statute 
unconstitutional. Likewise, the statute is in juxtaposition 
to the due process guaranty of Article 1, section 7 of the 
Constitution of Utah.1 
IV. 
DEFENDANTS FAILED TO OBSERVE STATU-
TORY AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS 
OTHER THAN REQUIREMENTS FOR NOTICE 
AND SUCH FAILURE INVALIDATES THE 
ATTEMPTED CHANGE OF ZONING. 
The instant change of zoning commenced when Bill 
Roderick, on behalf of Bill Roderick, Inc., delivered to Ralph 
Y. McClure, Salt Lake County Zoning Administrator, a $20 
filing fee and an application for zoning amendment. (Def. 
Ex. D-20). He did not comply with the remainder of the pro-
cedure of the zoning office (as set forth in Def. Ex. D-19)-
i.e., he did not submit names of property owners within 150 
feet of the subject parcels; he did not supply a signed state-
ment from property owners whose property was a subject 
of zoning change indicating their attitude concerning the 
rezoning, and he was not a proper applicant. Each of these 
things is required by the County's own zoning procedure 
(Def. Ex. D-19) 
Of the three noncompliances the most fatal is that Bill 
Roderick was not a proper applU:ant. The County's zoning 
:('i{i 
INaisbitt v. Herrick, supra, note 1 at p. 28. 
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procedure requires that applications for zoning amendments 
be filed by the owner of the property involved or by his au-
thorized agent.1 (Def. Ex. D-19 p. 3) 
At the time Bill Roderick filed the application for a 
zoning amendment he was not the owner of the subject 
property and was likwise not authorized by the owners of 
the property to make the application on their behalf. (R. 19-
20) 2 
On or about November 4, 1966, the Zoning Administra-
tor caused to be mailed to Henry S. Florence of the Holladay 
District Planning Commission a letter requesting action by 
that body. (Def. Ex. D-24.) Contemporaneously and before 
receiving any response from any member of the Holladay 
District Planning Commission, the staff of the Zoning Ad-
ministrator met and considered the application (Def. Ex. 
D-25.) 
IThe wisdom of this requirement is obvious. Without it conceiv· 
ably the owner of a commercial site could awaken one morning to 
find that someone else had caused his property to be rezoned residen-
tial or vice versa. 
2The subject property consists of two parcels, one of which was 
owned by Pearl B. Henrichsen, the other by Milton P. Matth~ws. 
(Def. Ex. D-3) Bill Roderick had no authority from Pearl Hennch· 
sen and only oral authorization from Matthews. The latt!'.r, howe~er, 
is not legally sufficient to permit Bill Roderick to apply smce sectwn 
57-1-8 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, requires a written 
power of attorney or other written' instrument granting power to !1il 
agent in instances where real estate is to be conveyed or otherwise 
affected. 
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On or about November 18, 1966 - again before receipt 
of any response from any member of the Holladay District 
Planning Commission - the zoning subcommittee and the 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission met and considered 
the application. 
On November 21, 1966 (being subsequent to action by the 
staff, the zoning subcommittee and the planning commis-
sion) the zoning office received a response from a single 
member of the Holladay District Planning Commission. (Pl. 
Ex. P-1) 
The written procedure of the zoning office for process-
ing applications for change of zoning requires that an ap-
plication be submitted first to the District Planning Commis-
sion which is allowed 30 days in which to act before the ap-
plication is considered by the Planning Commission. No 
explanation was given about why this application was given 
preferential treatment.1 
A municipal legislative body must substantially follow 
the internal regulations it has itself established relative to 
1The procedure of the County on change o~ zoning applications 
calls for a minimum of three months for processmg. (Def. Ex. D-19) 
First the application is submitted to the District Planning Commission 
which has thirty days in which to respond. Therea~ter the County 
Planning Commission has thirty days in which to consider the m~tJ:er. 
Following that, an additional thirty days is ni;c~ry fo~ J?roviding 
notice of the hearing before the County CommISS~on. '!hIB is not to 
say that in every case ninety days must be tak~n m which to pr~s 
an application. But it is obvious that there is greater opportunity 
for persons affected to learn about a hea~g ~ be hel.d before !Jie 
County Commission if the usual length o~ tm;ie lS taken m processing 
the application. Unlike interested parties m most cases, prope~ 
owners affected by this proceding had far less <;hance of lea~ng 
of the hearing because of the hasty and preferential treatment given 
this particular application. 
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zoning. County Comm'rs. of Arundel County v. Ward, 186 
Md. 330, 46 A.2d 684 (1946). It cannot deviate from exist. 
ing regulations or make exceptions therefrom on behalf of 
individuals. 8 McQuillan on Municipal Corporations, § 
25.253. 
The opening sentences of section 17-27-17, Utah Code 
Annotated, provide: 
But any such amendment shall not be made or 
become effective unless same shall have been pro-
posed by or first submitted for the approval, disap-
proval, or suggestions of the district planning com-
mission and shall have approval by the county plan-
ning commission. If any such amendment be dis-
approved by either the county or the district plan-
ning commission within thirty days after such sub-
mission, to become effective, it shall receive the 
favorable vote of not less than a majority of the en-
tire membership of the board of county commission-
ers. 
It is clearly the intent of the statute that the Board 
of County Commissioners should have the benefit of the 
thinking and recommendation of the District Planning Com-
mission prior to its own action. This consideration is lacking 
in the present case. 
Testimony of Mr. Hall, a member of the District Plan-
ning Commission, demonstrates that he acted alone; that 
there was never a meeting of the District Planning Commis· 
sion on this matter and that residents in the area contacted 
by him uanimously opposed a change of zoning. (R. 3-10) 
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From the evidence, the trial court should have held that 
the Holladay District Planning Commission did not act as 
a commission. Consequently, the County Commission was 
denied the chance of considering the thinking and feeling of 
the District Planning Commission and those citizens whose 
recommendations it should property reflect.1 
This deviation from the statute is of no small moment. 
As stated in Armourdale State Bank v. Kansas City, 131 
Kan. 419, 421, 422, 292 Pac. 745, 746 (1930): 
A preliminary consideration of a proposed 
change in a zoning ordinance by a competent body of 
disinterested persons is not a mere formality but an 
essential and important prerequisite to official ac-
tion affecting the value and use of the private prop-
erty. The power to ordain city zoning ordinances, 
and to amend, supplement, or change them, is not a 
mere perquisite attaching to the office of the mayor 
and councilmen or city commissioners, to be granted 
or withheld at their grace or caprice. The legisla-
ture devised what it considered an effective barrier 
against such a possibility when it provided that 
zoning matters should first be considered by an 
impartial body of resident taxpayers chosen for that 
purpose. 2 
See also, Ford v. City of Hutchinson, 140 Kan. 309, 
37 P.2d 39 (1934). 
1 Defendants' exhibits D-34, p. 9 and D-35~ p. 2 dem<;>~trate that 
the specious document of the District ~l~rng . Co~10n was .a 
factor considered by the County CoIIlilllss1oners m arnvmg at their 
decision. 
2The impartiality of Mr. Hall'~ reco!11filendatii;in is questionable 
due to the impropriety of the applicant. m contactin&" ~r. Hall 8;Jld 
urging him to return the recommendation of the District Planning 
Commission to the Zoning Administrator post haste. (R. 5) 
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v. 
DEFENDANT COMMISSIONERS' ACTIONS 
WERE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
At the County Commission level all parties to a zoning 
matter stand at parity. That is, each need only prove or 
disprove the merits of the application for a change of zon-
ing. A different situation exists, however, on appeal for 
judicial review. At this level a court will not substitute its 
judgment for that of the commission even though the court 
itself might have come to a different conclusion. Naylor v. 
Salt Lake City Corporation, 17 Utah 2d 300, 410 P.2d 764 
(1966). Consequently on judicial review the only chance of 
upsetting a zoning decision other than by showing a depriva-
tion of rights without due process of law is by being able to 
demonstrate that the County Commission acted arbitrarily 
and capricously. Gayland v. SaU Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 
307, 358 P.2d 633 (1961). 
The rule heretofore stated has merit in cases such as 
Gayland and Naylor where the party opposing the zoning 
had a chance to make a record before the County Comrnis· 
sion. However, in the present case this rule should not be 
strictly applied as appellants have been denied in the first 
instance a chance to present evidence before the County 
Commission.1 
Notwithstanding that the Court should not apply harsh-
ly to appellant this "arbitrary and capricious" rule, this I 
Court may - from the record which was established -
1 In addition because plaintiffs' complaint was dismi~ed th~ po~· 
ture of the case on appeal is that the evidence must be viewed Ill \ 0 
light most favorable to appellants. Clark v. City of Boulder, 146 Co 0· 
526, 362 P.2d 160 (1961). 
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interfere with the decision of the Commission since "there 
is no reasonable basis whatsoever to justify it and its ac-
tions must therefore be regarded as capricious and arbi-
trary." Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 410 P.2d at 
766. 
Further in reviewing the decision below this Court 
should bear in mind that: 
Findings and conclusions of a trial court as to 
the reasonableness [constitutionality] of zoning ordi-
nance are not binding on appellate courts if the 
record shows that that question is debatable and the 
appellant court may consider in some detail the basic 
physical facts appearing on the record, such as char-
acter of the property of the objecting parties, nature 
of the surrounding territory, use to which each has 
been put, recent trends of development, etc. Lock-
ard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 202 P.2d 
38 (1949) 1 
(a) In refusing to permit property owners affected 
by the attempted change of zoning from having an oppor-
tunity to be heard, the defendant Commissioners acted arbi-
trarily and capriciously. 
Immediately upon first learning that the County Com-
mission had held a hearing upon the subject property, inter-
ested homeowners in the area signed a petition for re-
consideration. (Pl. Ex. P-48) Significantly, over 200 home-
'In rezoning matters the presumption o~ reasonableness o_f. the 
zoning amendment does not have the same we1g~t. as does th~ onginal 
zoni•g; hence the courts are more free_ to scrutimze ,the ments of the 
rezoning. Northwest Merchants Terminal, Inc. v. 0 Rourke, 191 Md. 
171, 60 Atl. 2d 743, 752 (1948). The reason for this difference is obvious 
An amended zoning ordinance does not have the same th~JUght ~nd 
study behind it as exists behind a master or comprehensive zorung 
Plan. 
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owners signed the petition.1 The petition was addressed 
to the Salt Lake County Commission and on January 10, 
1967, was personally delivered to Commissioners Hanson 
and Blomquist (R. 128). Notwithstanding the petition, the 
following morning, January 11, 1967, Commissioner Blom-
quist signed an Ordinance, reclassifying the subject prop-
erty. 
The County Commission's intemperate act of refusing 
to hear or even consider the evidence proposed to be offered 
by citizens who had no prior opportunity to be heard and 
who would be most immediately affected by its decision 
amounts to a clear abuse of the Commission's power and an 
infringement upon citizen rights. 
In outlining procedures and considerations required of 
Salt Lake County in administering its zoning powers, this 
Court has stated: 
1Among those who petitioned the County Commission in a des-
perate attempt to be heard were adjoining property owners: 
(i) the property owner abutting to the south (H. R. Hen· 
richsen, also known as Harold R. Hendrichsen 4555 South 2300 
East, exhibits D-48 (7th sheet) and D-3); . 
(ii) the property owners adjoining the east side of Russell ' 
Street which adjoins the subject property to the east, (Emerson 
H. Kennington and Audrie M. Kennington, 4507 Russell Street, 
Agnes Helen Keller, 4503 Russell Street, and Hazel W. Fisher, 
4505 Russell Street, exhibits D-48 (7th sheet) and D-3); 
(iii) a property owner adjoining the north side of 4500 Sou~h 
Street which adjoins the subject property to the north, (Darwt!J 
Dowsett, 2361 East 4500 South, exhibits D-48 (9th sheet) an 
D-46); 
(iv) the property owner at the northwest corner of the 
intersection of 2300 East _and 4500 South, kitty-corner. f~om ~~ 
subject property (Ellen Pihl, 4482 South 2300 East, exhibits D 
(12th sheet) and D-47), and 
(v) thirty-five owners of dwellings in Carriage Lane f°eci 
dominium, directly southwest across 2300 East from the su l 
property (exhibits D-48 (5th and 6th sheets) and D-47) .. 
Thus, owners of property adjoining all sides of the subJect prop· 
erty sought to be heard. 
. . It [the ?~unt~ Commission] has the responsi-
b1hty of adv1smg itself of all pertinent facts as a 
basis for determining what is in the public interest 
in that regard. For this reason, it is entirely appro-
riate to hold public hearings and to allow any inter-
ested party it desires to give information and to pre-
sent their ideas on the matter . . . In performing 
their duties, it is both their privilege and ·obligation 
to take into consideration their own knowledge of 
such matters and also to gather available pertinent 
information from all possib1le sources and give co~ 
sideration to it in making their determination. Gay-
land v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 
633, 636 (1961) [Emphasis added] 
The consequence attendant to failure to observe these 
requirements was also spelled out by the Court: 
[T] he court can impede decisions of legislative 
bodies where the actions of the latter are "unconsti-
tutional" for some such reason as it deprives one of 
property without due process of law, or capriciously 
and arbitrarily infringes upon his rights therein 
or is unjustly discriminatory. 358 P.2d at 636. 
In this case, a highly responsive "source" - affected 
citizens - tried desperately to supply to the County Com-
missioners considerable information and facts pertaining 
to the subject matter. This offer was summarily rejected. 
As noted from the Gayland decision, there is nothing 
requiring or limiting the Commission from considering in-
formation brought to its attention subsequent to the date 
of a public hearing; and, in fact, it would seem that such 
action is required for as long a time as the ordinance is un-
der advisement. 
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That the ordinance was still under .advisement at the 
time the citizens' petition was tendered to the Commissioners 
is clear from the contents of a letter sent by the Commis-
sioners following their December 28, 1966, meeting to the 
Zoning Administrator requesting the latter "to prepare an 
ordinance on same [the subject property] which will be pre-
sented at a later date for the Board's final approval." (Def. 
Ex. D-37) 
It is well settled that a municipal legislative body may 
reconsider its action and rescind an ordinance that has been 
previously enacted or enact an ordinance that has previously 
been defeated, and it may act thusly at any time before 
the rights of third parties have become vested.1 In other 
words, the municipal legislative body has a right to recon-
sider under properly adopted parliamentary procedure its 
votes upon questions properly pending before it, and such 
body may rescind action previously taken.2 
On January 10, 1967, no one had a vested interest in 
the zoning ordinance covering the subject property, and the 
Commission, if it had properly discharged its duties as out-
lined in the Gayland case, could have withheld signing the 
ordinance until proper consideration was given to the posi- ' 
tion of the abutting property owners and other citizens re-
questing the right to be heard. 
The Commission's action "capriciously and arbitrarily 
infringe [ d] upon the rights ... " of those citizens who peti-
'MacMahon v. Davis 284 Ill. 439, 120 N.E. 326 (1918); Tuell v. 
Meacham, Contracting Co., 145 Ky. 181, 140 S.W. 159 (1911); Mc· 
Corwughey v. Jackson, 101 Cal. 265, 35 Pac. 863 (1894). 
2/d. 
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tioned for reconsideration of the zoning change and who 
had not had their "day in court."1 Gayland, supra, at 636. 
(b) Both the method by which the subject property 
was rezoned and the result of the rezoning are unreasonable 
and unconstitutional. 
Section 17-27-4 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
is a directive to the County to "make and adopt a master 
plan for the physical development" of the County. The 
purpose of the plan is to accomplish "a coordinated, ad-
justed and harmonious development of the county which 
will, in accordance with present and future needs and re-
sources best promote the general welfare of the inhabitants 
. . . " of the county. Section 17-27-5 Utah Code Annotated. 
Pursuant to legislation, Salt Lake County in 1965 adoptr 
ed a Master Zoning Plan. (Def. Exs. D-42, D-43) A review 
of the Master Plan of Salt Lake County and the Master 
Plan map clearly shows that the area in which the subject 
property is located was earmarked for residential develop-
ment only (Def's. Ex. D-42, p. 43) 2 
1 A parallel to the action of the County Commission is the abuse 
of discretion of a trial judge in not setting aside a default judgment 
of a party who makes a timely request in cases where there is reason-
able justification for setting aside the default. Mayhew v. Standard 
Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962). 
'Defendants and intervenor stipulated to plaintiffs proffer of 
evidence that the area surrounding 2300 East and 4500 South con-
sists of expensive homes. (R. 161-2). See also plaintiffs' exhib~ts 
P-15 16 17 and defendants' exhibit D-34, p. 9. (Testimony of a wit-
ness 'for' applicant, Mary _Metcalf, at the C~unty_ Commissio~, level 
said that this "is a very highly developed residential area . . . ) 
In its petition for reconsideration directed to the County Com-
missioners and in its complaint below, appellants sought to prove 1J?.at 
the decision of the County Commission was erroneous .. In each rn-
stance appellant has had to make the best record J!<>SSible over the 
refusal of the Commission and court to hear such eVIdence. (R. 184) 
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Further, scrutiny of the Master Zoning Plan shows no 
provisions for commercial zoning of the type in question 
here. With reference to commercial zoning the Master 
Zoning Plan refers to three types: i.e., a central business dis-
trict, regional shopping centers, and community and neigh-
borhood shopping centers. At no point does the plan recom-
mend, suggest or propose permitting spot zoning.1 Central 
business districts are intended to serve the over-all needs of 
communities. Regional shopping centers such as the Cot-
tonwood Mall are designed to serve each planning district. 
Community and neighborhood shopping centers on the other 
hand are "proposed to be conveniently located to serve local 
shopping needs throughout the valley." (Def. Ex. D-42, p. 3) 
(Salt Lake County Master Zoning Plan) 
The smallest recognized and permissible commercial de-
velopment is the community and neighborhood shopping 
centers. To conform with the Master Plan these community 
and neighborhood shopping centers must be designed and 
located in an area appropriate to provide for the convenient 
needs of people living in their immediate vicinity. Further, 
these small centers must "range from three to ten acres in 
'The goals and policies which guided the prepa~B;tion, of the 
Master Plan were formulated by the Salt Lake Valley Citizens Coon· 
cil. (Def. Ex. D-42, p. 22.) This particular council was extremely 
concerned about strip zoning which is simply. 8;Il o~tgrowt~ af s~~ 
zoning. In this regard the Salt Lake Valley Citizens Council stat · 
An excessive amount of strip or thoroughfare comm~~cial 
development which results in traffic congestion, lack of SJ.!ffiCid~ 
parking, rapid turnover of tenants and_ consequent. phys1car ~ 
terioration of buildings because of unsatisfactory busme~ vo fu~ 
These strip developments, for the mos~ P3:rt, b~gan P!1°r toned 
adoption of zoning. Such development is s~ill. gomg on m .unzo ned 
areas such as Hunter-Granger and to a limited exten.t in zo. g 
areas through the granting of additional commercial Mm~~ 
(Planning Goals and Policies for the Salt Lake County as 
Plan, p. 11) [Emphasis added] 
43 
size." (Def. Ex. D-42 p. 31.) 1 That the subject property 
fails to meet these standards is clear. The property is only 
slightly over one acre - considerably below the size require-
ments necessary to develop a neighborhood center. (Def. 
Ex. D-20) Neighborhood shopping centers for the area sur-
rounding the subject property have already been provided 
for. Commercially zoned property of the neighborhood 
shopping size, or greater, within a short distance of the sub-
ject property includes the downtown Holladay shopping 
area, the Cottonwood Mall, much of both sides of 33rd South 
between Highland Drive and Wasatch Blvd., large shopping 
centers at 39th South and Wasatch Blvd., at 45th South 
and Wasatch Blvd., and neighborhood shopping centers at 
39th South and 2300 East and 27th East and 40th South. 
(Def. Exs. D-44, Zoning Map Section A and Zoning Map 
Section B, and Def. Ex. D-33.) 
The very use of the terms "zoning" has come to mean 
land use regulation pursuant to a "comprehensive zoning 
ordinance." Metzenbaum, Law of Zoning, p. 19 (2nd ed., 
1955). Utah courts are clearly concerned with the orderly 
development of communities: 
The basic purpose of zoning is to "bring about an 
orderly development of cities, to establish districts 
into which business, commerce and industry shall 
not intrude, and to fix certain territory for differ-
ent grades of industrial concerns. * * * The exercise 
[of this power] must have a substantial relation to 
1With reference to the size of comrounity and neighborhood sh<;>I?-
ping centers it was the recomroendation of the Salt Lake Valley Citi-
zens Council that the centers have five to ten acres as ~ av~ 
number of acres to be developed. See, final report of Plannmg 
and Policies for Salt Lake County Master Plan, p. 18. 
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the public good within the spheres held proper. White 
Appeal, 287 Pac. 259, 134 Atl. 409, 412, 53 A.L.R. 
1215. It is a fundamental theory of the zoning 
scheme that it shall be for the general good, to secure 
reasonable neighborhood uniformity, and to exclude 
structures and occupations which clash therewith. 
Marshall v. Salt Lake County, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 
704, 709 (1943). 
The only way of keeping the Master Zoning Plan viable 
is by requiring that amendments to it conform to and be in 
accordance with it. Freeman v. Yonkers, 205 Misc. 947, 
129 N.Y.S. 2d 703 (1954). 1 Consequenly where the amenda-
tory action is not in accordance with the comprehensive plan, 
is in no way calculated to achieve the statutory objectives and 
results in unwarranted discrimination in favor of the owner 
of the lot in question, the reclassification is invalid. Cassi· 
nari v. Union City, 1 N.J. Supp. 219, 63 A.2d 891 (1949); 
Appley v. Township Committee, 128 N.J.L. 195, 24 A.2d 
805 (1942). See also Marshall v. Salt Lake City, supra. 
In order to achieve the purpose of the Master Zoning 
Plan uniformity is required. For example, section 17-27-11 
Utah Code Annotated provides that: 
All such regulations shall be uniform for each class 
or kind of building or structure throughout any zone. 
The intent of language such as this was set forth in 
DeBlasiis v. Bartell, 143 Pa. Super. 485, 18 A.2d 478 (1941): 
1 In this regard the Master Zoning Plan states: be 
Revision of Salt Lake County Zoning ordinance should ed 
· · t• b concern carried out as a special program by part1c1pa_ ion Y ublic. 
governmental agencies as well as representatives of the P 
Def. Ex. D-42, p. 57. [Emphasis added] 
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The enabling statute on which the zoning ordinance 
must rest declares that regulations under the ordi-
nance must be uniform for each class or kind of 
buildings, structures or land throughout each dis-
trict. And this is in harmony with the general rule 
that the ordinance adopted under a zoning law must 
not be unreasonably discriminatory. While the City 
Council has broad powers in this respect, it has no 
right or authority to place restrictions on one per-
son's property and arbitrarily and by mere favor 
remove such restrictions from another's property 
there being no reasonable grounds or basis for their 
discrimination. 
The important language quoted which is fundamental 
in zoning is that all property similarly situated is to be 
classified alike. Arbitrary discrimination is improper and 
unconstitutional. Amendatory action must be grounded in 
reason and judgment based upon the policy of the statute. 
Appley v. Township Committee, supra. 
( c) It is clear that the decision rezoning the southeast 
corner of 2300 East and 4500 South is not grounded upon 
reason or based upon the policy of the statute. 
Amendments to zoning plans are permissible only if 
(i) they conform to the master or comprehensive zoning 
plan or (ii) they benefit the general public. 149 A.L.R. 
292; 51 A.L.R. 2d 63. A possible third ground used in in-
stances where the amendment appears contrary to a com-
prehensive plan is where either the plan is outdated or the 
neighborhood has deteriorated to the extent that the plan 
is no longer applicable to it. Crone v. Town of Brighton, 
119 N.Y.S. 2d 877 (1952). 
Taking the above points in reverse order, there was 
no evidence before the County Commission at its December 
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28,. 1966 meeting or before the trial court in this action 
which indicates that there has been any deterioration in 
the high quality residential nature of the area.1 All of the 
evidence that is in the record is to the contrary.2 
Similarly there is not one scintilla of evidence in the 
record before the County Commission or the court indicat-
ing a public need or demonstrating a benefit to the public 
• • 
1T_h.e present case is easily distinguishable from this Court's de-
c1s1on m Naylor u. Salt Lake City Corporation, 17 Utah 2d 300, 410 
P. ?c! 764 (1966). In Naylor there was a record which supported the 
dec1s1on rendered: 
From the record viewed in the light most favorable thereto 
theri: are a number of considerations which can be regarded as 
tending to support the rezoning ordinance and the trial court's 
judgment sustained as valid. Among these are: that there has 
been a gradual extension of the business and commercial usage 
of the property outward from the center of the city in the direc· 
tion of this area; that there is some congestion and deterioration 
of residence, the removal of which may tend to alleviate health 
hazards and an increasing crime rate, particularly among juven· 
iles in that locality; that the Commission has in other similar 
situations used the classification of "Business B-3" as buffer 
zones between residential and commercial and business areas. 
410 P. 2d at 766. 
No such reasons exist in the present case. 
2Mary Metcalf, one of the witnesses supporting intervenor (then 
the applicant for change of zoning) at the so-called hearing befor:e ~e 
County Commission on December 28, 1966, recognized the existing 
residential character of the area. Def. Ex. D-34, p. 9. The text ~( 
her comment is: "It is a very highly developed residential area .. · · 
Pl. Ex. P-1, P-17 and P-18 which are photographs of the area mtro-
duced to reflect the absence on any utility pole of any piece of paper 
or other notice of the hearing to be held December 28, 1966, shrs 
its existing high class residential character. See also the Master P.h 
(Def. Ex. D-42) and the Master Plan map (Def. Ex. D-43) whic 
reflect the same. Because of the ruling of the trial judge not to rt;t 
ceive evidence "on the merits" plaintiffs were not permitted to subJllJ 
evidence such as p~otographs o_f dw~llings in the area as a whole ~ 
reflect its general high-class residential ~haracter. On the oth~r h~al 
there is no evidence from defendants or mtervenor that the res1den d 
character of the neighborhood has deteriorated. Furthe~ore.23;d fendants and intervenor stipulated that the area surroundmg 
East and 45th South consists of expensive homes. R. 161-2. 
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generally to come from zoning the subject property commer-
cial.1 And in fact the evidence clearly demonstrates the 
opposite. 
For the public generally to benefit from an amended 
zoning ordinance, that ordinance must promote the "health, 
safety, morals, convenience, order, prosperity and welfare 
of the present and future inhabitants of Salt Lake County 
... " Section 8-1-2 Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 
1953. That the commercial zoning of the subject property 
would run contrary to the intent of the above quoted section 
was the unanimous recommendation of the Salt Lake County 
zoning staff and the Salt Lake County Planning Commis-
sion: 
Twenty-three Hundred East is a major artery and 
future widening is proposed. Traffic on the street 
at present is very heavy and the Staff feels that 
granting this zoning change would only contribute 
to the congestion ... its nearness to other commer-
cial zones raises the question as to whether additional 
commercial sites are necessary. (Def. Ex. D-25) 2 
The Zoning Staff, the Zoning Committee and the Plan-
ning Commission unanimously voted to deny the zoning 
1In Marshall v. Salt Lake City 105 Utah 111, 141 P. 2d 704 (1943), 
the Court upheld a comprehensive zoning ordinai:ice as it ~ontribu~ed 
to the general welfare. Basically the general zorung plan m questi?n 
provided that within reasonable walking distance of all homes, dally 
family convt>niences and necessities must be available. The Court 
merely found that the ordinance in question accomplished f:his res~t; 
was consequently in harmony with the City's comprehensive zorung 
plan and did not violate the following principle: 
But the principle is fund~~nt~l t?at the city ~ zoning, must 
do so by districts and not by indiscriminate spot zorung. 141 P. 2d 
at 709. [Emphasis by the Court] . 
'The Master Zoning Plan provides that _two o! t~e fu?1re ma1or 
arterial roads in the Big Cottonwood Planrung D1stnct will be 23rd 
East and 45th South. (Def. Ex. D-42, p. 42). 
application. (Def. Ex. D-25) Despite this and in the ab. 
sence of any evidence to the contrary the Salt Lake County 
Commission overruled its o-wn zoning staff and Planning 
Commission and approved the application. Such action is 
patently arbitrary and caprcious. Gayland, supra. 
The only other ground for amending a master plan viz., 
-that the amendment conforms to the intent of the master 
plan - is not satisfied in this case. The Salt Lake County 
Master Zoning Plan clearly provides that the area in ques-
tion is intended to be used for residential development. (Def. 
Ex. D-42, D-43.) Nor can the rezoning be justified as a 
permitted change in the Master Plan, such as for a neighbor-
hood shopping center because the subject property is not 
large enough and because no need has been shown.1 
Where the above grounds cannot be readily shown, the 
rezoning is not favored because in too many instances the 
1The whole intersection or a major part of property surrounding 
it must be changed to commercial if it is to be justified as a permitt.ed 
deviation from the Master Plan. Owners of property abutting the 
subject property are the ones who are hurt. The rezoning did not 
change their property to commercial. They cannot reap any of the 
financial benefits of commercial zoning, but are damaged by its detn· 
ment.s. Herein lies the grossly unfair discrimination by this act 
of the Commission. The abutting property owners have not been 
treated uniformly. There is no evidence of record to justify ~Y 
specially favored treatment of the subject property for commerc1al 
use which is not equally applicable to the abutting property. If an 
area large enough for a neighborhood shopping center (from 3 to 10 
acres) had been zoned commercial at this location the '.lction. of the 
Commission conceivably might be justified as in keepmg with 7e 
purposes of the Master Plan. But there is no justification at all : ~ 
permitting this tiny spot of commercial property, unconnected witu; 
and blocks away from any other commercially zoned property, . 
intrude into a residential area. Otherwise, a tiny spot of commerCJ~ 
use could be created at every intersection in the County and thereb) 
prevent any planned development, resulting in all of the I?rob~ernJ 
of no zoning at all, the removal of which is the only co!IBtitutJO_n t 
justification for inference with property rights by zorung, m the fus 
instance. 
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rezoning is only an aid to some private owner or parcel 
rather than being for the general welfare of the entire 
community. Metzenbaum, supra, p. 1517(b). As stated in 
the syllabus to Ellicott v. Mayor of Baltimore, 180 Md. 176, 
23 A.2d 649 (1942): 
An exception of a single lot from operation of city 
ordinance zoning area in which it is located as resi-
dential district, in order to permit erection of a fill-
ing station hereof is illegal, though attempted by 
municipal ordinance, unless made because of excep-
tional conditions under authority of enabling act and 
there can be no valid exception thereof merely as a 
favor to a lot owner because it is more profitable to 
him if used for such purpose.1 
On January 10, 1967, 204 citizens in the affected area 
presented to Defendant Commissioner Blomquist a written 
petition requesting that the County Commission reconsider 
its action and permit them to be heard. The very next day 
Commissioner Blomquist in the absence of Chairman Han-
son signed the ordinance amending the zoning classifica-
tion of the subject property. This was done in spite of the 
petition before the Commission. 
The trial judge would not permit plaintiffs to examine 
Bill Roderick, president of Bill Roderick, Inc., as to any 
possible relationship between Commissioner Blomquist and 
Mr. Roderick. However, prior to having this line of ques-
tioning completely cut off, plaintiff did establish that Com-
10r as stated in Harrington v. Board of Alamo Heights, 124 S.W. 
2d 401, 407 (Tex., 1939): . . b · 
The Board may not destroy the general ~estncbon Y p1ec~­
meal exemption of pieces of land. equ~ly subJect to t!ie h~d_ship 
created in the restriction, or arbitrarily grant a special pnVIlege 
denied to others. 
See also, Sundlund v. Zoning Board of Pawtucket, 50 RI. 108, 145 Atl. 
451 (1929). 
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missioner Blomquist is a good friend, "business-wise" of Bill 
Roderick, president of Bill Roderick, Inc. (Testimony of 
Roderick, R. 15) 
The plaintiff was prevented from developing a com. 
plete record on this point. Nonetheless, and in view of even 
the sketchy information developed, there is sufficient reason 
to conclude that Commissioner Blomquist should have ab-
stained from acting on this matter.1 
The evils arising from facts such as exist in the present 
record were clearly spelled out in Cassel v. Mayor and City 
Counc~l of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 73 A.2d 486 (1950): 
"Spot zoning" the arbitrary and unreasonable devo-
tion of a small area within a zoning district to use 
which is inconsistent with the use to which the rest 
of the district is restricted, has appeared in many 
cities in America as a result of pressure put upon 
councilmen to pass amendments to zoning ordin-
ances solely for the benefit of private interest. While 
the City Council has wide discretion in enacting 
zoning ordinances, it has no authority to place re-
strictions on one person's property and by mere 
favor remove such restrictions from another's prop· 
erty, unless there is reasonable ground for the dis· 
1By way of analogy, section 17-27~15 Utah Code Annota~ 1953, 
as amended with respect to membership on the Board of AdJustment, 
states: 
The Board of County Commissioners may appoint associate 
members of such board, and in the event that any regular membetyr 
be temporarily unable to act owing to absence from the coun Jili 
illness, interest in a case before the Board, or _any_ <?ther cause, 
place may be taken during such temporary disabiht)'. by an asso-
ciate member designated for the purpose. [Emphasis added~ , 
Here is an express directive that an interested pu_blic ~ff~ct 
should temporarily absent himself from a zoning matter m whicf th: 
has an interest. The same rule should equally app~)'. to a member. 0 in 
County Commission, . i.e., he shoul?- be disqualified from act!Jl~ote 
zoning matters in which he has an mterest - no matter how re 
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~rimination. ~oreover, increase in "spot "zoning" 
m course of time would subvert the original sound-
ness of t~e. comprehensive plan and tend to pro-
duce conditions almost as chaotic as existed before 
zoning. It is universally held that a "spot zoning 
ordinance" which singles out a parcel of land within 
the limits of a use district and marks it off into a 
separate district for the benefit of the owner 
thereby permitting a use of that parcel inconsistent 
with the use permitted in the rest of the district 
is invalid if it is not in accordance with the compr~ 
hensive zoning plan and is merely for private gain. 
The end result of the zoning change attempted by Salt 
Lake County is an arbitrary and capricious act. Supporting 
this conclusion is Clark v. City of Boulder, 146 Colo. 526, 
362 P.2d 160 (1961), a decision which cannot be distin-
guished from the instant case. In Clark, the City of Boulder 
attempted to change to commercial zoning three lots within 
a residential area for the erection of a filling station. The 
action was taken contrary to the recommendations of the 
City Planning Board. Further the area in which the prop-
erty in question was located was zoned residential under a 
comprehensive plan and ordinance adopted in 1954. Though 
the three lots involved were within a residential area, the 
comprehensive plan established an area to the east of the 
tract in dispute as a shopping center with various retail 
outlets, including a filling station. Intervenors, petroleum 
products distributors and operators of filling stations, had 
purchased the lots in question. The trial court held for the 
intervenors dimissed the complaint and owners of the 
' dwellings in the area appealed. The Colorado Supreme 
Court reversed with directions to enter judgment in favor 
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of appellants. Citing authorities, the court stated: 
The principles of these cases are applicable he 
I dt .. h re. n e e~mmmg w ether spot zoning is involved, 
the test is whether the change in question was mad 
wit? the purpose of furthering the comprehensiv: 
z?nmg plan or designed merely to relieve the par. 
ticular property from restrictions of the zoning 
regulations. . . . 
Under the facts of this case it cannot be said that 
re-zoning part of a planned residential area to per-
mit a filling station is other than an arbitrary act 
and a proper exercise of the police power. It clear· 
ly fails to take into account the need for reasonable 
stablity in zoning regulations ... That the property 
may not be used as profitably for residential pur· 
poses as for commercial use, furnishes no justifica· 
tion for special treatment thereof . . . 
One of the difficulties with intervenors' position 
is that it fails to recognize that unless a zoning line 
is drawn somewhere there can be no zoning at all. 
Property owners have the right to rely on existing 
zoning regulations when there has been no material 
change in the character of the neighborhood which 
may require re-zoning in the public interest .. · 
In addition, the development and growth of a com· 
prehensively zoned area in accordance with the uses 
permitted under the plan, does not permit emascula· 
tion of such plan under the guise of "changed con· 
ditions" as defendants here contend .... 
We conclude that the ordinance under review does 
not promote any of of the statutory purposes under 
which zoning ordinances are enacted, and violates 
the previously adopted comprehensive plan. On the 
basis of this record it cannot be upheld. 362 P.2d at 
162-163. 
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The decision in the Clark case is good law and sup-
ported overwhelmingly by the decisions of other juisdic-
tions and is not only applicable and controlling, but in-
distinguishable from the instant case. 
(d) When looked at cumulatively the acts and omis-
sions of Salt Lake County are flagrantly discriminatory, 
arbitrary and unconstitutional. 
A number of acts and omissions of defendant County 
Commission demonstrates the arbitrariness of their deci-
sion. We list a few: 
1. In summarily overruling the decision of the 
Zoning Staff, Zoning Committee and the Planning Com-
mission without reason therefor, the County Commis-
sion wrecked havoc with the statutory framework 
which created the Planning Commission and provides 
for a Master Plan. Simply stated, the statute creating 
a Planning Commission and a Master Plan must have 
some meaning. If the County Commission need pay no 
heed to the findings and work of the Planning Com-
mission and may, notwithstanding the Planning Com-
mission's decision and the absence of any economic 
evidence to the contrary, change a comprehensive zon-
ing plan, then the statutory framework creating the 
Planning Commission and the Master Plan is meaning-
less and the function of the Planning Commission and 
the Master Plan is meaningless. 
2. On January 10, the County Commission was 
presented with a petition of 204 owners of dwellings 
in the area asking for reconsideration of the rezoning 
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and for an opportunity to be heard. The following 
morning, January 11, the ordinance officially adopt. 
ing the change was signed by Commissioner Blomquist 
although all pertinent evidence had not been received. 
In Linden Methodist Episcopal Church v. Linden, 113 
N.J.L. 188, 173 Atl. 593 (1934) the court held a re-
zoning invalid where it was passed by the common 
council with unseeming haste and without having taken 
testimony. Cf., Gayland v. Salt Lake County, supra. 
3. Commissioner Blomquist as a friend - "busi· 
nesswise" - of Bill Roderick, president of Bill Roder· 
ick, Inc. should have abstained from participating in 
the decision on this matter. See Linden Met}i()dist 
Ep'iscopal Church v. Linden, supra. (Owner of prop-
erty in question a member of city council.) 
4. The scanty and pedantic attempts of the 
County to comply with the notice requirements of the 
statute are constitutionally inadequate. (See discus· 
sion in sections II and III, supra.) In fact, in reviewing 
the actions of the County Commission it appears that 
the attempts at "notice" were calculated not to in· 
form or at most to misinform interested parties. 
Had the County been discharging its duty to inform 
homeowners in the area to be affected it would, among other 
things, have 
(i) required the applicant to supply names and 
addresses of owners of property within 150 feet of the 
. . d d all other subject property (as its rules prov1 e an as 
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applicants for a change of zoning are required to do) 
before proceeding with the application; 
(ii) required the District Planning Commission to 
have a chance to meet and discuss the change with 
homeowners in the area before the Planning Commis-
sion acted (as is required for all other applicants); 
(iii) required the District Planning Commission 
to be fully staffed and capable of informing residents 
in the area before proceeding (as the statute requires). 
(iv) taken the normal amount of time required 
to process an application, (usually three months), 
rather than trying to rush it through to decision by 
the lame-duck Commissioners before they left office; 
· (v) required written proof by the applicant that 
he owned the property or had a written power of at-
torney from all owners before proceeding with the ap-
plication. (It was only 35 days between the time ap-
plicant purchased the property [and thereby had the 
right to cause it to be rezoned] and the time he sup-
posedly had it rezoned); 
(vi) required a policing of the flimsy pieces of 
paper which were tacked on utility poles to make cer-
tain that they were viewable for at least a reasonable 
part of thirty days and were not torn off by appli-
cant or some other person before the property owners 
in the area had a chance to see them; and 
(vii) required that the affidavit of publication 
of notice given by the zoning staff be accurate and 
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truthful. 
The general flavor from the attempts of the prior 
County Commission to do only what they thought the 
notice statute required, and not one jot or tittle more, and 
the outright refusal of the new County Commission to per-
mit owners of dwellings in the affected area to present any 
evidence can lead to only one conclusion - the County 
Commissioners did not want to be put to the trouble of hear. 
ing from owners of dwellings directly affected by their 
acts; they were perfectly satisfied to follow archaic notice 
procedures (such as publication of a legal description only 
and posting on the west steps of the City and County 
Building miles away from the subject property in the hope 
that no affected property owner would learn about their 
intended act and appear to oppose), notwithstanding that 
civilization and methods of communication have taken great 
leaps forward and almost everyone today reasonably ex· 
pects to learn about important happenings via much faster, 
simpler and easier methods of communication, such as by 
a letter or by a phone call. Obviously the decision of the 
prior Commission to destroy a residential neighborhood 
by the intrusion of a pitifully small commercially zoned 
spot is much easier to slip through if the owners of dwell· 
ings do not learn about it; further, such action then makes 
it possible for the new Commission to deftly hide from 
realities and duck their responsibilities to dwelling owners 
and taxpayers merely by saying to irate owners of homes 
that no opposition appeared at the so-called hearing, the 
prior Commission is to blame, and we're sorry - you had 
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your chance and we can do nothing about it. The flavor of 
this kind of abdication of the responsibilities of government 
to the general public when viewed as a whole, can lead to no 
other conclusion than that both Commissions acted arbi-
trarily, capriciously, unreasonably and with reckless and 
wanton disregard of the rights of owners of dwellings to be 
informed of proposed zoning changes, to be heard im-
partially and to be treated fairly and forthrightly in 
keeping with modern times and the comparative ease with 
which at least adjoining property owners could be told about 
the proposed change of zoning. 
The conclusion is inescapable that each of the Commis-
sions did not really want to be bothered - each wanted to 
put this commercial island in the middle of a residential 
area no matter who of the citizens was hurt, and as such 
the actions of both Commissions cannot stand, being arbi-
trary, capricious and unreasonable. 
( e) The unreasonableness of defendants actions vi ti· 
ates the legality of the rezoning. 
In reviewing legislative acts the Court may properly 
consider the over-all "reasonableness" of the exercise of 
power. As stated in United States v. Abendon, 24 Philip-
pine Report, 169 (1913): 
Although ordinances may not contravene a constitu-
tion or statute and may be within the scope of 
charter powers, yet, if they seem to the court op-
pressive, unfair, partial or discriminatory they are 
declared unreasonable and void whether this appears 
from their face or from proof aliunde. (Elliott 
Municipal Corporation, 198-202; Lakeview v. Tate, 
130 Ill. 247; Kip v. Peterson, 26 N.J.L. 298; Ex parte 
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Frank, 52 Cal. 606; Toney v. Macon, 119 Ga 83· 
Carrollton v. Bazette, 159 Ill. 284; Mt. Vernon Ba~ 
v. Sarlls, 129 Ind. 201; State v. Mahner, 43 La. Ann. 
496; Red Star Steamship Co. v. Jersey City 45 N.JL 
246.) ' '' 
Nothing could be more oppressive, unfair, discrimina. 
tory and unreasonable than defendants County Commis-
sioners refusal to permit affected home owners the right 
to present their case before a body supposedly representing 
their interest. Cf., Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 358 P. 
2d at 636. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' actions were legally deficient as the no-
tice requirements of the zoning statute were not complied 
with; viz., there was no posting in a "public place"; at 
most two, not three, notices were posted, none of the post-
ings was "designed" to give notice; and the contents of 
the various legal descriptions were inaccurate and insuffi. 
cient. The aforementioned facts notwithstanding, the no-
tice provision of section 17-27-17 deprived property owners 
of their constitutional rights of due process. Finally, the 
arbitrary and capricious acts of the various defendants were 
violative of their respective duties and therefor invalid. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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